PRINT DATE: 08/20/98

### FAILURE MODES EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA) - CIL HARDWARE

NUMBER:05-2A-21949M -X

SUBSYSTEM NAME: COMM & TRACK: AUDIO

REVISION: 0

10/03/96

PART DATA

PART NAME VENDOR NAME

PART NUMBER **VENDOR NUMBER** 

1RU

: PANEL A1A3

VO70-730347

SRU

: SWITCH, TOGGLE

ME452-0102-7201

### EXTENDED DESCRIPTION OF PART UNDER ANALYSIS:

SWITCH, A/G 1 AND A/G 2 (UHF) TOGGLE SWITCH, AIR-TO-GROUND CHANNELS (A/G 1 AND A/G 2) FOR THE UHF COMMUNICATION LINK, DPDT, ON-OFF.

REFERENCE DESIGNATORS: . 36V73A1A3S31

36V73A1A3S32

QUANTITY OF LIKE ITEMS:

TWO, A/G1 AND A/G2

#### FUNCTION:

ð.

D&C MANUAL CONFIGURATION OF THE AUDIO DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (ADS) VIA THE RIGHT (PLT) AUDIO TERMINAL UNIT (ATU) OR THE MISSION SPECIALIST (MS) ATU. SELECTS THE AUDIO DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM A/G 1 OR A/G 2 CHANNEL FOR TRANSMISSION AND RECEPTION OF VOICE WITH THE SPACE-TO-SPACE ORBITER RADIO (SSOR). REDUNDANCY FOR A/G1 AND A/G2 IS PROVIDED INTERNALLY SIMULTANEOUSLY BY TWO POLES: ONE POLE IS CONNECTED TO THE RIGHT (PLT) ATU AND THE OTHER POLE IS CONNECTED TO MS ATU. .

### FAILURE MODES EFFECTS ANALYSIS FMEA - CIL FAILURE MODE

NUMBER: 05-2A-21949M-02

REVISION#: 0

10/03/96

SUBSYSTEM NAME: COMM & TRACK: AUDIO

LRU: PANEL A1A3 ITEM NAME: SWITCH, TOGGLE

CRITICALITY OF THIS FAILURE MODE: 2/2

FAILURE MODE:

SHORT-TO-CASE (GROUND)

MISSION PHASE:

LO LIFT-OFF

OO ON-ORBIT DO DE-ORBIT

VEHICLE/PAYLOAD/KIT EFFECTIVITY:

102 COLUMBIA

103 DISCOVERY 104 ATLANTIS

105 ENDEAVOUR

AFTER SPACE COMM MODIFICATION

### CAUSE:

PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PROCESSING ANOMALY.

CRITICALITY 1/1 DURING INTACT ABORT ONLY? NO

REDUNDANCY SCREEN

ALN/A

B) N/A

C) N/A

PASS/FAIL RATIONALE:

A)

B)

C)

- FAILURE EFFECTS -

#### (A) SUBSYSTEM:

SWITCH A/G 1 (S31) OR SWITCH A/G 2 (S32) SHORT-TO-CASE (GROUND) WILL RESULTED IN LOSS OF THE A/A (\$33) SINCE ALL THREE SWITCHES SHARE A COMMON LINE. LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO SELECT ANY UHF SSOR AUDIO CHANNEL (LOSS OF UHF).A

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### FAILURE MODES EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA) -- CIL FAILURE MODE NUMBER: 05-ZA-21949M-02

SWITCH A/G 1 (S31) OR SWITCH A/G 2 (S32) SHORT-TO-CASE (GROUND) WILL RESULTED IN LOSS OF THE A/A (S33) SINCE ALL THREE SWITCHES SHARE A COMMON LINE. LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO SELECT ANY UHF SSOR AUDIO CHANNEL (LOSS OF UHF).

### (B) INTERFACING SUBSYSTEM(S):

LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO SELECT ANY UHF SSOR AUDIO CHANNEL (LOSS OF UHF).

### (C) MISSION:

LOSS OF MISSION IF EVA OR STATION RENDEZVOUS VOICE COMMUNICATION IS REQUIRED."

## (D) CREW, VEHICLE, AND ELEMENT(S);

NO EFFECT

### (E) FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY EFFECTS:

#### - TIME FRAME -

TIME FROM FAILURE TO CRITICAL EFFECT: MINUTES

## -DISPOSITION RATIONALE-

#### (A) DESIGN:

REFER TO APPENDIX A, ITEM #1, TOGGLE SWITCH.

### (B) TEST:

REFER TO APPENDIX A, ITEM #1, TOGGLE SWITCH.

## GROUND TURNAROUND TEST

ANY TURNAROUND CHECKOUT TESTING IS ACCOMPLISHED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OMRSD.

### (C) INSPECTION:

REFER TO APPENDIX A, ITEM #1, TOGGLE SWITCH.

#### (D) FAILURE HISTORY:

CURRENT DATA ON TEST FAILURES, FLIGHT FAILURES, UNEXPLAINED ANOMALIES, AND OTHER FAILURES EXPERIENCED DURING GROUND PROCESSING ACTIVITY CAN BE FOUND IN THE PRACA DATABASE.

# FAILURE MODES EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA) -- CIL FAILURE MODE NUMBER: 05-2A-21949M-02

(E) OPERATIONAL USE:

FOR SSOR EVA COMM - CREW IS TRAINED TO SAFELY TERMINATE EVA IF MINIMUM REQUIRED COMM IS LOST.

FOR SSOR STATION REDEZVOUS - ALTERNATE COMM LINKS WOULD:BE USED IF AVAILABLE (E.G. RELAY VIA GROUND SITE OR A VHF RADIO LIKE USED FOR SHUTTLE MIR).

| - APPROVALS -  |   |   |
|--|---|---|
| PAE MANAGER PRODUCT ASSURANCE ENGR DESIGN ENGINEERING NASA SSMA UNF NASA SUBSYSTEM MANAGER NASA MOD USA/SAM AUDIO NASA SSM | : POLLY STENGER-NGUYEN: VAN D. NGUYEN : D. Y. YOON : Mike Penney- more & Chaure : Karen Blumentritt : Eddie Burrell | Manuager 8-20-98  Manuager 8-20-98  Manuager 8-26-98  Wand O Vang 8-26-98  Manuager 8-26-98  Manuager 8-26-98  Manuager 8-26-98  Manuager 8-26-98  Manuager 8-26-98 |